12 research outputs found
Recommended from our members
Secure Remote Attestation for Safety-Critical Embedded and IoT Devices
In recent years, embedded and cyber-physical systems (CPS), under the guise of Internet-of-Things (IoT), have entered many aspects of daily life. Despite many benefits, this develop-ment also greatly expands the so-called attack surface and turns these newly computerizedgadgets into attractive attack targets. One key component in securing IoT devices is malwaredetection, which is typically attained with (secure) remote attestation. Remote attestationis a distinct security service that allows a trusted verifier to verify the internal state of aremote untrusted device. Remote attestation is especially relevant for low/medium-end em-bedded devices that are incapable of protecting themselves against malware infection. Assafety-critical IoT devices become commonplace, it is crucial for remote attestation not tointerfere with the device’s normal operations. In this dissertation, we identify major issues inreconciling remote attestation and safety-critical application needs. We show that existingattestation techniques require devices to perform uninterruptible (atomic) operations duringattestation. Such operations can be time-consuming and thus may be harmful to the device’ssafety-critical functionality. On the other hand, simply relaxing security requirements of re-mote attestation can lead to other vulnerabilities. To resolve this conflict, this dissertationpresents the design, implementation, and evaluation of several mitigation techniques. In par-ticular, we propose two light-weight techniques capable of providing interruptible attestationmodality. In contrast to traditional techniques, our proposed techniques allow interrupts tooccur during attestation while ensuring malware detection via shuffled memory traversals ormemory locking mechanisms. Another type of techniques pursued in this dissertation aimsto minimize the real-time computation overhead during attestation. We propose using peri-odic self-measurements to measure and record the device’s state, resulting in more flexiblescheduling of the attestation process and also in no real-time burden as part of its interactionwith verifier. This technique is particularly suitable for swarm settings with a potentiallylarge number of safety-critical devices. Finally, we develop a remote attestation HYDRAarchitecture, based on a formally verified component, and use it as a building block in ourproposed mitigation techniques. We believe that this architecture may be of independentinterest
ACFA: Secure Runtime Auditing & Guaranteed Device Healing via Active Control Flow Attestation
Low-end embedded devices are increasingly used in various smart applications
and spaces. They are implemented under strict cost and energy budgets, using
microcontroller units (MCUs) that lack security features available in
general-purpose processors. In this context, Remote Attestation (RA) was
proposed as an inexpensive security service to enable a verifier (Vrf) to
remotely detect illegal modifications to a software binary installed on a
low-end prover MCU (Prv). Since attacks that hijack the software's control flow
can evade RA, Control Flow Attestation (CFA) augments RA with information about
the exact order in which instructions in the binary are executed, enabling
detection of control flow attacks. We observe that current CFA architectures
can not guarantee that Vrf ever receives control flow reports in case of
attacks. In turn, while they support exploit detection, they provide no means
to pinpoint the exploit origin. Furthermore, existing CFA requires either
binary instrumentation, incurring significant runtime overhead and code size
increase, or relatively expensive hardware support, such as hash engines. In
addition, current techniques are neither continuous (only meant to attest
self-contained operations) nor active (offer no secure means to remotely
remediate detected compromises). To jointly address these challenges, we
propose ACFA: a hybrid (hardware/software) architecture for Active CFA. ACFA
enables continuous monitoring of all control flow transfers in the MCU and does
not require binary instrumentation. It also leverages the recently proposed
concept of Active Roots-of-Trust to enable secure auditing of vulnerability
sources and guaranteed remediation when a compromise is detected. We provide an
open-source reference implementation of ACFA on top of a commodity low-end MCU
(TI MSP430) and evaluate it to demonstrate its security and cost-effectiveness
Probabilistic and Considerate Attestation of IoT Devices against Roving Malware
Remote Attestation (RA) is a popular means of detecting malware presence (or verifying its absence) on embedded
and IoT devices. It is especially relevant to low-end devices that are incapable of protecting themselves against infection.
Malware that is aware of ongoing or impending attestation and aims to avoid detection
can relocate itself during computation of the attestation measurement. In order to thwart such behavior,
prior RA techniques are either non-interruptible or explicitly forbid modification of storage during measurement
computation. However, since the latter can be a time-consuming task, this curtails availability of device\u27s other
(main) functions, which is especially undesirable, or even dangerous, for devices with time- and/or safety-critical missions.
In this paper, we propose SMARM, a light-weight technique, based on shuffled measurements, as a defense against
roving malware. In SMARM, memory is measured in a randomized and secret order. This does not impact device\u27s availability --
the measurement process can be interrupted, even by malware, which can relocate itself at will. We analyze various
malware behaviors and show that, while malware can escape detection in a single attestation instance, it is
highly unlikely to avoid eventual detection
ASSURED
Secure firmware update is an important stage in the IoT device life-cycle. Prior techniques, designed for other computational settings, are not readily suitable for IoT devices, since they do not consider idiosyncrasies of a realistic large-scale IoT deployment. This motivates our design of ASSURED, a secure and scalable update framework for IoT. ASSURED includes all stakeholders in a typical IoT update ecosystem, while providing end-to-end security between manufacturers and devices. To demonstrate its feasibility and practicality, ASSURED is instantiated and experimentally evaluated on two commodity hardware platforms. Results show that ASSURED is considerably faster than current update mechanisms in realistic settings.Peer reviewe